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Abstract
A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states
that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the
equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I
show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players have
social preferences of the form frequently assumed in the recent litera-
ture, for example in the inequity aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In fact, repeating the unique
stage game equilibrium may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium at
all.
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1 Introduction
A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that
if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of
the stage game is being played in every period. This result has been much
used in applied theory, in particular in industrial organization with the most
prominent example being the chain—store paradox of Selten (1980). It is also
frequently being invoked in experimental economics when a stage game is
played amongst the same set of players (partner or fixed matching) for a
finite number of periods.
The purpose of this note is to point out that the result described above
does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the
form frequently assumed in the recent literature, for example in the inequity
aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
In fact, repeating the unique stage game equilibrium may not be a subgame
perfect equilibrium at all in some examples. The logic is simple. In the
standard case of selfish preferences, payoﬀs are separable across periods in
the sense that the optimal choice in the last period does not depend on
anything that has happened in previous periods. For most models of social
preferences, this no longer holds. What has happened in previous periods
influences the relative payoﬀs and therefore also the optimal choice in the
last period, which makes it impossible to treat the last period as independent
from the rest of the game.1
2 Examples
Example 1 (Dictator game) As a simple illustration consider the follow-
ing example of a dictator game with three options for the proposer: (0 100)
(40 40), (100 0), where  in ( ) denotes the the amount of money al-
located to the dictator and  denotes the amount of money allocated to
the other player, the recipient. Choose your favorite model of social prefer-
1 In other words, the game is now a stochastic game.
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ences and parametrize it such that the proposer ranks (40 40) Â (100 0) º
(0 100) In all examples in this section, preferences depend on average pay-
oﬀs across periods as is usually assumed in the theory of finitely repeated
games. Assume further that preferences are monotone in the sense that
( ) Â ( ) for   .
Clearly, the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is to allocate the
money (40 40). However, in the twice repeated game there are two subgame
perfect equilibria (SPE) that yield the sequence of allocations (100 0) →
(0 100) or (0 100)→ (100 0) respectively. Since (50 50) Â (40 40), repeat-
ing the unique stage game equilibrium twice is not a SPE of the repeated
game.
Example 2 (Ultimatum game) This example shows that the ineﬃciency
of the outcome with equal payoﬀs from the previous example is not a nec-
essary condition. Consider a twice repeated ultimatum game, in which the
proposer can make oﬀers of  ∈ [0 100] to the responder. Suppose the re-
sponder is known to be inequity averse as in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model such that he will reject any oﬀer   30. For a proposer, who is
supposed to care only about his own payoﬀ, the unique best reply is to
choose  = 30. Hence, all SPE of the stage game result in  = 30 which
is accepted by the responder. Yet, in the twice repeated ultimatum game,
all oﬀers 1 2 in the two periods with (1 + 2)2 = 30 would be part of a
SPE.
Example 3 (Trust game) Consider a 5 times repeated trust game. The
stage game payoﬀs of the investor and the trustee are (   ) = (2 0) if the
investor does not invest. If he invests, the trustee can split the pie equally
(4 4) or keep everything for himself (0 8). Suppose players are inequity
averse but not too strongly if it is to their advantage. In particular, suppose
that (2 0) Â (0 8) (16 16) Â (2 0), (16 16) Â ( ) if   16  ,
and ( −  ) Â ( − 0 0) for all  and   0.2 The unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the stage game entails no investment. Yet, all subgame
perfect equilibria of the 5 times repeated game entail investment in one of
2This would be the case, for example, in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model if  in
equation (2) is such that 02    05 for both players.
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the 5 rounds. Suppose there was no investment in the first 4 rounds. By
investing in the last round, the investor can equalize average payoﬀs to
(16 16) which is preferred by him to (2 0), which would result from not
investing in the last period.
3 Model and main result
In the following I shall consider a (normal form) stage game  = { ()
()},3 where  = 1   is the set of players,  is a set of pure actions
for player  and ( −) is player ’s payoﬀ function given his action and
the action profile of all other players −. An  ∈  := × is referred to
as an outcome of . The finitely repeated game ( ) results when  is
successively played  times and players are informed about the outcome 
after each period .
The crucial assumption is how players evaluate the outcome sequences
() ∈  . The standard assumption in the theory of finitely repeated games
is that player  evaluates () according to his average payoﬀ,
Π := 1
X
=1
() (1)
(cf. Benoit and Krishna, 1985, and Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).
When applying the theory to social preferences, there are (at least) two
possibilities of how to evaluate payoﬀs. Given that in finitely repeated games
(and in almost all experiments) the payoﬀs are paid out to players at the end
of the game, it seems reasonable that players should evaluate an outcome
sequence () based on the profile of average payoﬀs of all players, (Π).
Assumption 1 Social preferences in a finitely repeated game can be repre-
sented by a utility function (ΠΠ−)
Likewise, one can assume that  depends on the sum of payoﬀs,P=1 (),
which does not aﬀect the main results. The crucial thing is that payoﬀs
3With slight modifications the analysis can also be applied to sequential stage games
with a unique SPE.
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for each player are first aggregated over periods and then compared across
players. An alternatively way would be to assume that payoﬀs are compared
period by period without allowing for compensation across periods. This
assumption is sometimes made for infinite games (see Duﬀy and Monoz—
Garcia, 2010), however mainly for reasons of tractability. It seems less
reasonable for the case of finitely repeated games. After all, why should a
player fail to consider the payoﬀs from diﬀerent periods as substitutes when
in the end all that matters is the average or total payoﬀ over all periods?
Several prominent social preference models can be applied in accordance
with Assumption 1. The inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
can be specified as
(ΠΠ−) = Π− 1− 1
X
 6=
max [Π −Π 0]− 1− 1
X
 6=
max [Π −Π  0] 
(2)
with 0 ≤   1 and  ≤ .
The model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) can be written as
(ΠΠ−) =  (Π )  (3)
where  := ΠP Π Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that  is
strictly concave in  and assumes a maximum for given Π if  = 1.
Furthermore, for given ,  is strictly increasing in Π.
Charness and Rabin (2002) assume a payoﬀ function of the form
(ΠΠ−) = (1− )Π + 
⎡
⎣min{Π1 Π}+ (1− )
X

Π
⎤
⎦

(4)
Finally, models of linear altruism or spite can be written as
(ΠΠ−) =
X

Π  (5)
For selfish preferences, the following result is well known (see e.g. Propo-
sition 157.2 in Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).4 It is instructive to follow
4As Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Definition 137.1) point out, the crucial assumption
for the standard result is “weak separability” of preferences.
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the steps of its proof to see why the result breaks down for most forms of so-
cial preferences. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Suppose further that (· ·)
is a linear mapping and hence
(ΠΠ−) = 
Ã
1

X
=1
() 1
X
=1
−()
!
=
1

X
=1
(() −()) (6)
Obviously, (6) is satisfied if  is given by (1) or (5) but not if it is given
by (2), (3), or (4). This is the reason why for most of the popular social
preference models the following proposition does not hold.
Proposition 1 Suppose payoﬀs in ( ) are evaluated by a utility function
(ΠΠ−) that satisfies (6). If the strategic game  has a unique Nash
equilibrium payoﬀ profile, then for any value of  the action profile chosen
after any history in any subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ) is a Nash
equilibrium of .
Proof. Consider the optimal action in period  . If (6) holds, then
argmax

(ΠΠ−) = argmax
1

X
=1
(() −())
= argmax

(( ) −( ))
The optimization problem in the second line is the same as the one in the
stage game. This implies that players’ payoﬀs in  are independent of
the history of play. Thus, in all subgames of ( ) starting in period  , the
outcome is a Nash equilibrium of . Therefore, also in all subgames starting
in period  − 1, the outcome is a Nash equilibrium of . The result follows
then by induction. ¤
If (· ·) is non—linear (e.g. because of the strict concavity with respect to
 in the model of Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, or the max—operators in the
model of Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the naive application of the backward—
induction argument fails.
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Thus, when applying social preference models to finitely repeated games,
care has to be taken. It will depend on the specifics of the game whether
the —fold repetition of the unique stage game equilibrium is still a SPE of
the repeated game. Uniqueness of SPE will in general be lost.
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